We propose a framework for understanding recurrent historical episodes of vigorous economic expansion accompanied by extreme asset valuations, as exhibited by Japan in the 1980s and the U.S. in the 1990s. We interpret this phenomenon as a high-valuation equilibrium with a low effective cost of capital based on optimism about the future availability of funds for investment. Key to the sustainability of such an equilibrium is a feedback from increased growth to an increase in the supply of funding. We show that such a feedback naturally arises when the expansion is concentrated in a newly emerging sector of the economy and when it is supported by conservative fiscal policy rules. Thus, an emerging "new economy" and sustained fiscal surpluses may constitute an integral part, as cause and consequence, of a "speculative growth" equilibrium.
Introduction
We propose a framework for understanding recurrent historical episodes of vigorous economic expansion accompanied by extreme asset valuations, as exhibited by Japan in the 1980s and the U.S. in the 1990s. We interpret this phenomenon as a highvaluation equilibrium based on optimism about the future availability of funds for investment and, therefore, about a low effective cost of capital. Key to the sustainability of such an equilibrium is a feedback from increased growth to an increase in the supply of funding. We show that such a feedback naturally arises when the expansion is concentrated in a newly emerging sector of the economy and when it is supported by conservative fiscal policy rules. Thus, technological revolution and sustained fiscal surpluses may constitute an integral part, as cause and consequence, of a "speculative growth" equilibrium. In extreme cases, the high-valuation equilibrium we analyze may give rise to a stock market bubble. In contrast to classical bubbles on non-productive assets, bubbles in our model encourage real investment and may appear in dynamically efficient economies. Other examples of such episodes of vigorous economic expansion under speculative asset valuations -what might be termed "speculative growth" -have been documented by economic historians. In the case of the United States, this phenomenon can also be observed in the expansions of the turn of the 20th century, of the 1920s, and of the 1960s (see Shiller 2000) . The nature and policy dilemmas of speculative expansions has attracted much attention, but our formal understanding of the macroeconomic mechanisms that underlie the relation between stock market This paper proposes a theoretical framework for understanding speculative expansions. Our interpretation of this phenomenon rests on two premises: (i) the rise in market valuations in speculative growth episodes result from optimism about the future availability of funds for investment, and therefore about a low effective long-term cost of capital; and (ii) the boom in investment and growth during such episodes is a response to increased asset prices along the standard q-theory line. The central question that arises under this interpretation is: How can the market be optimistic about the future abundance of capital when the economy is in a high-investment equilibrium that, presumably, will lead to a decline in the return to capital? A key component of our equilibrium account is a feedback mechanism by which the future supply of savings increases as a result of the conditions created by a speculative expansion, and ends up lowering the effective cost of capital.
This feedback from growth to saving finds support in recent cross-country evidence that growth precedes saving rather than the reverse. 2 There are several mechanisms that can support this feedback. For example, (i) the expansion might benefit dis-
proportionally agents who have a high marginal propensity to save; (ii) when partial self-finance is required by financial constraints, the expansion might incentivize saving by increasing the likelihood of achieving self-finance requirements; (iii) when it is associated with major technological developments, the expansion might generate future external spillovers that increase the income of savers; and (iv) the expansion could increase government revenues and result in higher public saving if tax rates 1 See, for example, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999) , Hobijn and Jovanovic (2001) , International
Monetary Fund (2000), Shiller (2000) , Cecchetti et al. (2000) . 2 The observation that higher growth is typically found to precede higher saving is documented in several recent studies (e.g., Carroll and Weil (1994) ). Caroll and Weil examine the aggregate relationship between income growth and saving in a cross-country panel of non-overlapping five-year averages of growth and saving derived from a sample of 64 countries over the period 1958-1987. They find that growth Granger causes saving with a positive sign, but that saving does not Granger cause growth. The estimated impact of growth on saving is not only statistically significant, but also very large in economic terms. The pattern of an acceleration in growth being followed by strong increases in saving rates is particularly clear in the experience of the high-growth, high-saving East
Asian economies of Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Gavin et al (1997) elaborate on the large economic significance of the growth-savings mechanism in Caroll and Weil's evidence.
and spending are left unchanged. We build on some of these channels to develop our theory.
Under certain conditions, the speculative growth equilibrium we analyze is characterized by a stock market bubble on accumulable capital. This occurs in the limit when speculative growth gives rise to such a high degree of investment that the economy ultimately goes past the "satiation" point where the marginal product of capital is zero. In that limit, the extreme valuations associated with market optimism about the future availability of funds and the effective cost of capital take the form of a stock market bubble. Thus, a distinctive feature of our interpretation of speculative expansions is that it is consistent with a stock market bubble, but it does not depend on the existence of bubbles. It is therefore robust to whether market speculation truly reflects a bubble, or simply fundamental pricing under a high degree of optimism about the future availability of funds.
The type of bubble on accumulable capital that appears in our analysis is quite different from the bubbles on non-productive assets analyzed in the classic literature on asset pricing in overlapping-generations models. 3 The latter bear little relation to what is observed during speculative growth episodes. They can only appear in a "dynamically inefficient" economy -one whose structure is conducive to the overaccumulation of capital; and their emergence helps absorb saving away from investment and alleviate the over-accumulation problem. Not only have empirical tests of dynamic inefficiency been negative; 4 but the notion that the emergence of a bubble would crowd out investment, while its bursting would increase investment, is contrary to the patterns depicted in figure 1 . The bubbles on capital in our analysis can arise in a dynamically efficient context. Moreover, rather than crowding out capital accumulation, they naturally encourage investment and growth; and their bursting leads to an investment slump as the economy rids itself of what appears ex post as widespread overcapacity.
5 3 For a presentation of this literature and its basic references, see Tirole (1985) and chapter 5 of Blanchard and Fisher (1989) . 4 Abel et al. (1989) show that dynamic inefficiency essentially implies that the net cash flow to investors from the aggregate market for assets is negative. They find no evidence of such feature in OECD economies during their period of study. 5 Several papers have demonstrated that, in the presence of externalities, bubbles can arise even if the economy is dynamically efficient (Saint-Paul, 1992; Grossman and Yanagawa, 1993; King and In section 2, we present a prototypical model of speculative growth. Our analysis is based on the Diamond (1965) overlapping-generations model, to which we add adjustment costs and a special assumption on the saving function. The latter assumption captures the growth-saving feeback that is central to the existence of a long run high valuation equilibrium. The former modification allows us to characterize stock market booms and their key role in facilitating the speculative path from low to high investment equilibria. We also show in this section that the limit of the high valuation equilibrium is an equity bubble.
Section 3 presents a specific instance of these mechanisms in a model of the "new economy." A salient characteristic of the recent speculative episode in the U.S. is that it affected mostly technology-related capital and was accompanied by an acceleration in productivity growth. The concurrence of speculative growth with expanded technological opportunities seems to characterize earlier periods of U.S.
economic history as well, such as the expansion of the turn of the twentieth century. 6 Our second model analyzes the relation between new technology and speculative growth. We show that, on one hand, the emergence of new technological opportunities favors a speculative growth equilibrium, as increased productivity and expansion potential can produce the long-run rise in the supply of funds necessary to support a high-investment equilibrium. On the other, a stock market boom may be needed to fully exploit the new technological opportunities. We conclude the section with a model of endogenous growth, where the new sector is a pure externality. This model allows us to capture the general idea that to the extent that there are obstacles to investing in what is mostly intangible capital subject to serious external spillovers, Ferguson, 1993; Azariadis and Reichlin, 1996) . The reason is that dynamic efficiency requires that the social rate of return exceeds the rate of growth of the economy. The possibility of a bubble, on the other hand, requires that the private rate of return be below the rate of growth. These two conditions are simultaneously feasible once an externality creates a wedge between private and social returns. The argument in this paper is of a different nature. It does not depend on an externality and shows that a bubble can arise even if we start with a private return that exceeds the rate of growth of the economy.
Olivier (2000) provides an example of a growth-enhancing bubble in the context of an endogenous growth model. His result is based on a different type of saving mechanism than ours and requires dynamic inefficiency. 6 See, e.g., Shiller (2000) .
a stock market boom, even a bubble, can be beneficial. By encouraging investment, it compensates for external spillovers and, in more general contexts, it substitutes for well-functioning financial markets that can finance risky entrepreneurial ventures.
Speculative growth may, therefore, not always present a case of overinvestment, but form an integral part of a technological revolution.
The models we develop in sections 2 and 3 represent closed economies with no public sector. However, an examination of the Japanese and U.S. episodes of speculative growth highlights the importance of the current account and fiscal surpluses for funding the speculative investment boom. In section 4, we extend our analysis to encompass these saving channels. In the short run, fiscal surpluses and current account deficits can arise as a consequence of the stock market rise and facilitate the initial investment boom. More importantly, both phenomena can play a central role in making the speculative equilibrium feasible by providing the funding necessary to sustain high investment in the long run.
Fiscal surpluses can be an integral part of a speculative growth equilibrium, being both the result of an investment boom and a key source for funding it. The possibility of using those surpluses to cut taxes or raise spending may be illusory, as the surpluses may be necessary to sustain the speculative growth equilibrium that generated them.
In some instances, international capital inflows to large economies may play a similar role. 7 When the speculative episode starts, domestic holders of capital may sell part of their capital gains to foreigners in order to fund investment. Over time, the whole world may be dragged into a speculative path, with the home economy becoming the chronic recipient of external resources.
Speculative Growth: The Mechanics
In this section we present a prototypical model of speculative growth. Our analysis is tral, otherwise the price of capital would be constant. The special assumption about the saving function is intended to capture the growth-saving feedback that is central to our interpretation of speculative expansions. Although this section introduces the feedback generically through the functional form of the saving function, the next two sections pay closer attention to the specific macroeconomic mechanisms that may be at work, and relate them to observed conditions during recent speculative growth episodes.
Model Setup
Consider a standard Diamond (1965) overlapping-generations structure with no population growth and a unit mass of young and of old agents who coexist at any date t. Each generation is born with a unit of labor, L t = L ≡ 1, to be used when young, for which it receives a total wage W t determined in a competitive, full-employment labor market. The economy's single consumption good is used as a numéraire.
Technology. Consumption goods are produced with capital, K t , and labor, L. The production function at any time t is determined by the level of technology, A t , which grows at an exogenous rate γ:
Production is given by a constant returns technology:
where
To simplify our discussion, we introduce further (conventional) assumptions on production through the wage function. The labor market is competitive, and the wage w t ≡ W t /A t L t per unit of effective labor is
Capital goods are accumulated with a constant returns technology:
where I t is the investment of consumption goods in capital goods production, x t ≡ I t /K t . The adjustment technology g(x) has g 0 > 0, g 00 < 0, g(0) = 0, and lim x→∞ g(x) = ∞. Normalizing both sides of the accumulation equation by effective labor, A t L,
Preferences and the saving function. Lifetime utility is a time-separable, concave function of consumption when young and old. Each member of generation t chooses the level of saving when young, S t , that maximizes lifetime utility. The relevant features of preferences are summarized in the level of saving, s t ≡ S t /A t L, which we assume is given by
where r t denotes the interest rate between periods t and t+1, s w > 0, and 0 < s r < ∞.
Capital market equilibrium. Following production in period t, the old sell their capital to the young at a price q t . The young allocate their savings to the purchase of the existing stock of capital and to investment in new capital. Thus the capital market equilibrium condition is
For any level of saving, the young take the price q t as given and decide how much of their savings will be allocated to purchase the existing stock of capital, k t , and how much to invest in new capital. They do so to maximize their stock of capital when old: (3) and (5), which yields the standard q-theory condition for investment:
This equation implicitly defines the investment function
The equilibrium interest rate can be expressed as a function of the stock of capital and its price. Replacing the saving and investment functions, (4) and (6), into the capital market equilibrium condition, (5), and substituting the wage from (1), yields:
It is straightforward to verify that r q > 0. On the other hand, the sign of r k is ambiguous. There are two opposing forces behind this ambiguity. First, with an increase in k comes a rise in saving of s w w 0 (k) -this lowers the interest rate. Second, as k rises, investment demand increases by (q + x) per unit of capital -this puts upward pressure on the interest rate. In general, the former effect dominates the latter for low levels of k, so that r k < 0 in this region. The concavity of the wage function implies that as k rises, eventually r k > 0. (3), and the arbitrage condition for holding a unit of capital from t to t + 1:
The right hand side of this expression is the gross return from holding the unit of capital. The only somewhat unusual term in this return derives from the adjustment cost function, as one unit of capital at time t yields 1 + G K units of capital at t + 1.
x, we will write with some abuse of notation
Replacing the interest rate function, (7), into the arbitrage condition, (8) , and noting that F K = f 0 , the system governing equilibrium dynamics can be written as a two-dimensional system in (k t , q t )-space:
Multiple Equilibria
In this sub-section, we show that, in the presence of a positive feedback from economic expansion to saving, our model can exhibit two equilibria: one characterized by low 8 By implicit differentiation of the capital market equilibrium condition, once the saving and wage functions are replaced in it, we obtain: r k = ((q + x(q)) − s w w 0 )/s r . The statement is that as k rises w 0 falls, so eventually r k > 0. This occurs as long as s w does not offset the decline in w 0 , which we assume almost everywhere (see below).
stock market valuations and low investment, and the other by high valuations and high investment. A generic way to introduce a feedback from expansion to saving is through the functional form of the saving function, s(w, r). We assume that if the economy expands past a level k o of the capital stock, the saving of the young increases sharply by ∆ s . Specific instances of economic phenomena that can give rise to such feedback will be analyzed in subsequent sections. We write the saving function as
where ∆ s > 0 and e s(w, r) is a continuous function in both arguments. In other words, saving jumps by ∆ s when the wage reaches w(k o ). Since we assumed that saving increases with the interest rate, it is easy to see from equilibrium in the capital market that the upward jump in the saving function translates into a downward jump in the interest rate function,
We analyze the equilibrium dynamics of system (9)- (10) in the heuristic phase diagram in (k t , q t )-space illustrated in figure 2 . We start by identifying the system's steady states, which correspond to the intersection of the two stable arms, {(k t , q t )
From equation (12), the k-constant arm is a horizontal line that corresponds to the single level of q t that balances the capital accumulation rate with the economy's growth rate. The shape of the q-constant arm is more complex. Assuming G 0 K hxi is not too large, this curve is downward sloping everywhere but at the discontinuity
where it exhibits an upward jump. 9 Moreover, by the Inada condition lim k&0 f 0 (k) = ∞, it converges asymptotically to the vertical axis as k t goes to zero.
The slope of the q-constant arm reflects equilibrium in the capital market: Starting at low levels of k, a higher stock of capital reduces the price q at which young savers are willing to purchase it since the marginal product of capital declines sharply. At 9 A sufficient condition for the q-constant arm to be downward sloping is r q > G
But it also holds under weaker conditions (e.g., see the example in the appendix). To gain further intuition on the behavior of q along its stable arm, let us re-write (13) as an asset pricing equation:
The price/earnings ratio, Multiple steady states. As can be seen from figure 2, it is possible for the two stable arms to intersect twice, once to the right and once to the left of k o . We assume this is the case for the economy and denote the steady state to the left of k o by (k * , q * ) and the steady state to the right of k o by (k * * , q * * ). It must be noted that the feedback from expansion to saving captured by the jump in the saving function, which yields the jump in the q-constant arm, is essential for the existence of the higher steady state, (k * * , q * * ).
Multiple equilibria.
Turning to out-of-steady-state dynamics, figure 2 illustrates the dynamics generated by the system of difference equations, (9)- (10) . There are six distinct regions, characterized by the direction of movement of k t and q t over time.
Each of the two steady states, k * and k * * , is saddle-path stable. This dynamic system gives rise to the possibility of multiple equilibria. Starting from the same intial value for the state variable, k, it is possible for two equilibrium paths to arise: one that takes the economy to the high-level steady state, (k * * , q * * ); and one that converges to the low-level steady state, (k * , q * ). We illustrate these possibilities in the next subsection. 11 
Speculative Growth
The nature of equilibrium dynamics in our model can be gauged from the simulation illustrated in figure 3 . The specific functional forms and parameter values underlying the simulation are presented in the appendix. Starting from the initial conditions of steady-state equilibrium (k * , q * ), figure 3 illustrates an unanticipated jump at time t = 1 to the equilibrium path that converges to the steady state (k * * , q * * ). In the 
, the growth of output Y t , and the investment/output ratio (I t /Y t ).
Market valuation. Starting from steady state (k * , q * ), the economy's unanticipated jump to the new equilibrium takes the form of an immediate rise in q and stock market gains (panel 3.a). While the price of capital remains above its original level along the equilibrium path, but it converges back to it over time, since q * * = q * .
On the other hand, the market's capitalization, qk, converges to a higher level, since
The key phenomenon that occurs when the economy moves to the new equilibrium 12 The asymptotic return of q and x(q) to their original level is due to the economy's fixed exogenous growth rate, γ, which, by (12) , uniquely determines steady-state x and q. In an endogenous growth model, γ, x, and q would be higher in one steady state than in the other.
is the rise in market valuations. By this we do not mean the absolute price level of capital or market capitalization, but their increase relative to the earnings generated by capital. As can be seen in panel 3.b, the P/E ratio rises when the economy moves to the new equilibrium and continues to rise along the equilibrium path. Compared to (k * , q * ), the new steady state, (k * * , q * * ), exhibits a higher P/E ratio and, therefore, a lower effective cost of capital.
The factor behind the increase in market valuations is the feedback from economic expansion to saving, incorporated in the jump in the saving function at k o . This jump creates an abundance in the supply of funds and results in a decline in the effective cost of capital. The stock market boom that takes place when the economy moves to the new equilibrium reflects optimism about the future availability of funds and the cost of capital. With this in mind, we will refer to the equilibrium associated with (k * , q * ) as the low-valuation equilibrium, and to the equilibrium associated with (k * * , q * * ) as the high-valuation equilibrium.
Investment and growth. The high-valuation equilibrium exhibits higher investment and growth than the low-valuation steady state. Since q is above its steady-state level along the high-valuation equilibrium path, x(q) is also above its steady state level and the capital stock grows to k * * . The growth in the capital stock causes an expansion in income growth during the transition (panel 3.c). Over time, the growth rates of capital and income return to normal, but the high-valuation steady state is characterized by permanently higher investment as a share of income (panel 3.d).
Of course, from the speculative growth path, the economy could experience an unanticipated jump down to a recessionary equilibrium path that takes it back to the low-valuation steady state. Along that path, the stock market crashes and triggers a slump in investment and growth as the economy rids itself of what appears ex post as widespread overcapacity.
Bubbles as a Limit
A distinctive feature of the high-valuation equilibrium is that, if the feedback from economic expansion to saving is strong enough, it can give rise to a stock market bubble. This will be the case if high investment results in capital accumulation beyond the "satiation" point where the marginal product of capital is zero. 13 To see this, let us assume that the production function exhibits a satiation point, (12) . However, the marginal product of capital for any k * * ≥ k is zero. All output in steady state goes to labor, and the aggregate stock market generates no earnings for its owners.
Thus, the positive value of q * * corresponds to a rational bubble that is only sustained by the possibility of trading with other agents.
Equilibrium quantities and prices are continuous as we move from bubbleless steady states to the left of k to the bubbly steady states to the right. Both q * * and x * * are the same across all steady states, and k * * crosses k continuously. Looking at present value expression (14) , it is apparent that as earnings in the numerator decline to zero, the effective cost of capital, r − G K , in the denominator must also decline to zero in order to leave their ratio, q * * , unchanged. Moreover, if the highvaluation steady state is bubbly, then the price of capital along the equilibrium path that converges to it also incorporates a bubble. Thus, a bubble emerges in this economy as a limit case of high stock market valuations based on optimism about the future availability of saving and a low effective cost of capital.
The type of bubble that arises in our model is quite different from traditional bubbles on the price of non-productive assets. First, while bubbles on non-productive assets absorb saving away from investment, bubbles on capital incentivize capital accumulation. Second, a central feature of the classical theory of bubbles on nonproductive assets is that they can only arise in economies whose bubbleless equilibrium is dynamically inefficient. Asymptotically, the argument goes, a bubble cannot grow faster than the economy's growth rate, γ. Otherwise, there would come a time when 13 See Chirinko and Schaller (2001) for evidence on the response of investment to bubbles in Japan.
14 By (4) and (5), increased saving shifts down the interest rate function, r(k, q), for any k ≥ k o .
Therefore, by (13) , the q-constant arm in figure 2 shifts to the right for k > k o and the highinvestment steady state level of capital, k * * , increases.
no agent is wealthy enough to hold it. Since a bubble grows at the interest rate, r, its existence is only compatible with r ≤ γ. Moreover, since the introduction of a bubble crowds out investment and, therefore, increases r, we must have r < γ in the bubbleless equilibrium. This condition implies dynamic inefficiency: capital must be accumulated at a rate γ that exceeds its return r, and therefore absorbs more resources than it generates. 15 Contrary to this argument, the bubbleless equilibrium in our model need not be dynamically inefficient for a bubble to arise. The main difference comes from the fact that introducing a bubble increases investment and, eventually, reduces r. Thus, it is possible to start from a dynamically efficient (r > γ)
bubbleless situation, that turns dynamically inefficient (r < γ) as a bubble eventually lowers r.
16
What makes a bubble in our model emerge in the price of capital as opposed to other, non-productive assets? If the bubbleless economy is not dynamically inefficient, the only asset that might support a bubble is capital. However, if a bubble on capital does arise, then it makes room for other bubbles on non-productive assets. The reason is that, in our model, a bubbly equilibrium can be shown to always drive the economy into a dynamically inefficient region.
17
In sum, stock market bubbles in our model are an extreme case of high market valuations and can arise in a dynamically efficient context. However, it is important to realize that the qualitative features of our model are robust to whether this limit is achieved or not. In our framework, bubbles are qualitatively not very different from any other high valuation equilibrium. 15 See the seminal discussion in Tirole (1985) . 16 Another unusual feature of bubbles in this model is that they need not grow at the rate of interest. The reason is that the existence of a bubble in q increases the value qG K of the marginal improvement in capital-accumulation capacity associated with existing units of capital. Essentially, a bubble on capital generates additional bubbles on the capital this asset helps to produce. This "speculative" dividend enters arbitrage condition (8) and allows the bubble to grow at a rate less than the rate of interest; or, in equilibrium, allows for a strictly positive interest rate (equal to G k ) despite the fact that q * * does not grow. 17 To see this, recall that the effective cost of capital, r − G K , is zero in a bubbly steady state.
Since G K = g − g 0 x < g and since, by (12) , g = γ, we must have r < γ. In this section we argue that the emergence of a new production sector is associated with a natural growth-funding feedback that provides a prime instance of the mechanisms that can support a speculative growth equilibrium. We also argue, in an endogenous growth context, that such speculative growth results in increased productivity growth.
An Emerging-Sector Model
A two-sector economy. We make two modifications to the model in section 2: (i)
we introduce a second production sector; and (ii) we drop the assumption that the expansion-saving feedback comes from preferences and assume more conventional household saving behavior. The feedback from expansion to saving now originate endougenously from the two-sector structure of the economy.
Recall that production in the model of section 2 uses production function
where k t is subject to adjustment function g(x t ). We now add a second sector that produces the same consumption good using a different type of capital, denoted by Z t , as the only variable input in the following production function:
where z t ≡ Z t /A t . 18 For simplicity, we assume that consumption goods can be transformed one-to-one into Z with no adjustment costs. This implies that the price of Z is always one, and that equilibrium z t can be solved out as a function of the interest rate from
We refer to the k-sector as the "new" sector and to the z-sector as the "old"
sector. The main difference between the new sector and the old sector is that the latter reaches maturity earlier than the former -it exhibits stronger diminishing returns and, therefore, more limited expansion opportunities. Expanding capital in the old sector leads to greater diminishing returns on capital and benefits wages by less -both key drivers of our results. 19 We capture the former characteristic by assuming |h 00 | to be large enough, and the latter by eliminating labor as an input in the old sector.
Because the expansion-funding feedback originates in the interaction between the new and the old sector, we now introduce preferences of a very conventional type.
We assume that household utility is of the undiscounted log-form, which implies that the saving of the young is given by
Saving is independent of the interest rate because income and substitution effects cancel out.
The capital market equilibrium condition with two capital stocks is given by
Since (15) allows us to solve out for z t+1 as a function of the interest rate, we can focus directly on the saving that goes into the new sector, defined as s k t ≡ s t − (1 + γ)z t+1 . By (15)- (17) , it is given by
Having solved out for the old-sector capital stock, we obtain a saving function into the new sector that is similar to function (4) in section 2. However, the difference is that the positive interest-elasticity of s k (w t , r t ) does not come from preferences, 19 The relation between greater diminishing returns in the old sector and a lesser benefit for wages can be captured as follows. Assume a production function F (K, L) for the new sector and φ(F (Z, L))
for the old sector, where φ 0 > 0 and φ 00 < 0. In the low-valuation steady-state equilibrium, assuming no adjustment costs, the marginal products of capital and labor must be equal:
. These conditions hold if we assume φ 0 (F (Z * , L * )) = 1. Under these conditions, it is easy to see that, at the low-valuation steady state, the the old sector exhibits greater diminishing returns to capital:¯φ 00
and a smaller improvement in wages from capital deepening:
but from the possibility of reallocating saving from the old to the new sector. This new sectoral saving function captures all relevant information about the old sector to calculate equilibrium. From here on, the model can be solved exactly as in section 2.
The interest rate function, r t = r(k t , q t ), is defined implicitly by the capital market condition s k (w(k t ), r t ) = (x(q t ) + q t )k t . Dynamics are given by the same system, (9)-(10) as in section 2.
Expansion and saving. The key mechanism in this two-sector model is the endogenous relation between expansion and saving. First, we show that, as the economy expands, it grows k t proportionally more than z t . The new sector is better able to generate saving than the more mature old sector and can therefore function as an engine of expansion. Under our specific model assumptions, this effect takes place because only expansion in the the new sector generates wages and saving. The ratio of the two capital stocks can be derived from (16), taking (3) and (17) into account:
By the concavity of the wage function, w(k t ), we know that w(k t )/k t is a decreasing function of k t . Thus, for given q t , the ratio z t /k t falls as k t expands.
Second, we examine the feedback on saving, s t = 1 2 w(k t ), from expanding k t .
Given q t , the effect of this feedback on the capital market and the interest rate is measured by the surplus 1 2 w(k t ) − (x(q t ) + q t ) k t that it generates. This surplus funds capital in the z-sector and, therefore, determines the interest rate by (15) . By the concavity of the wage function, the surplus is positive for low values of k t and negative for high values of k t . Therefore, the impact on the interest rate of increasing k t ,
given by (16)- (17) ,
is negative for k t < k(q t ) and positive for k t > k(q t ), where k(q) is defined implictly from w 0 (k(q)) = x(q) + q. For low k t , expanding the new sector generates more saving than it uses and reduces the interest rate; for high k t , it generates less saving and increases the interest rate. Note that the effect of k t on the interest rate is greater, the greater is the degree of diminishing returns, |h 00 |, in the old sector.
Multiple equilibria. As before, equilibrium dynamics can be analyzed in (k t , q t )-space by focusing on the two stable arms, (12)- (13), illustrated in figure 5 . The k-constant (14), which we reproduce for convenience:
As illustrated in figure 5 , we show that, as k increases, the slope of the q-constant arm is first negative, then positive, then negative again. Given the dynamics illustrated in the figure, this gives rise to two saddle-path stable steady states: (k * , q * ) and
The slope of the q-constant arm is given by Q k /(1 − Q q ). One can show that the denominator is positive as long as G 0 K is small enough, which we assume to be the case in the range q ∈ [0, q * ]. The numerator is given by
Let us fix q t . Since lim k→0 f 00 /f 0 = −∞, for small k t the dominant term in Q k is the first term and is negative. This corresponds to the standard determination of steadystate capital under diminishing returns. As k t increases, the second term gains in relative importance. As we saw from equation (19), r k is negative for low values of k t and positive for high values of k t . If diminishing returns, |h 00 |, in the old sector are sufficiently strong, the second term will be large and will cause Q k first to turn positive, then to turn negative again. In an intermediate range of k t , the dominant factor becomes the feedback from expanding the new sector on saving. In this region, expansion of the new sector creates a funding surplus that reduces the cost of capital and cause asset valuations to increase.
As in section 2, the two steady states, (k * , q * ) and (k * * , q * * ), correspond to low and high valuations, respectively. Both are associated with the same price of capital, q * = q * * . However, (k * * , q * * ) exhibits a lower marginal product of capital and a lower effective cost of capital than (k * * , q * * ). This gives rise to the possibility of two equilibrium paths starting from the same initial capital stock, one that converges to the low-valuation steady state and one to the high valuation steady state.
Example. A special example of the emergence of multiple steady states can be analyzed if the old-sector production function, rather than being smooth, is a step function of z:
By (16)- (17), the surplus that can be used to fund the z-sector is z t+1 = (1 + γ)
Because of the concavity of the wage function, w(k t ), there can be two levels of k, k(q) and k(q), such that this surplus equals z. By (15), this implies that the interest rate is given by
In this special case, the phase diagram around the high-valuation and low-valuation steady states is the same as that in figure 2 of section 2. 20 By (14) , the q-constant arm jumps up at a value of k where the surplus of saving generated by the new sector allows the interest rate to jump down from r H ro r L , and is downward-sloping on both sides because of diminishing returns in the new sector.
20 If k * < k(q * ), which we assume, there can be no equilibrium in the region k > k(q). The reason is that in this region the q-stable arm is the continuation of the same arm for k < k(q), which is monotonically decreasing and has already intersected the k-stable arm at k * .
Discussion. The dominant forces that determine the low-valuation steady state, (k * , q * ), is diminishing returns in the two sectors. Equilibrium is reached when marginal products are equal in both sectors, after taking account of adjustment costs.
However, the two sectors would respond very differently in an expansion beyond (k * , q * ). It is the relative immaturity of the new sector compared to the old that makes the high-valuation steady state, (k * * , q * * ), possible. It implies that the new sector is the one that can generate the saving necessary to fund an expansion, and must therefore grow proportionally more than the old sector. In our specific model, the new sector's ability to generate saving is by increasing wages. More generally, it can do so through other forms of income -such as profits or, if it is technologically intensive, through externalities. The relative immaturity of the new sector also implies that the old sector experiences stronger diminishing returns, |h 00 |. If this were not the case, given that the old sector expands proportionally less, it would compete for saving with the new sector and would cause the interest rate to rise relative to the new sector marginal product. This would prevent a sufficient fall in the effective cost of capital that is behind the high-valuation steady state, and would make the latter steady state impossible. Specifically, the size of |h 00 | (or the gap r L − r H in our example) is what determines the degree to which the q-constant arm rises past k * in the phase diagram. If this effect is not sufficiently strong, a second crossing between the two stable arms and the high-valuation steady state would not be possible.
What determines transitional dynamics along a speculative growth expansion?
Suppose the economy starts at the low-valuation steady state and experiences an unanticipated jump onto the equilibrium path that converges to the high-valuation steady state. Sector reallocation plays an important role in this transition. The immediate increase in capital accumulation in the new sector is due to the reallocation of capital from the old sector to the new, accompanied by a jump in q combined with an initial increase in the interest rate. As the new sector expands, it starts generating a saving surplus that helps restore resources to the old sector and reverses the hike in the interest rate. Ultimately, as the economy converges to (k * * , q * * ), the old sector expands beyond its initial capital stock and the cost of capital falls below its initial level.
The initial upward jump in the price q of new-sector capital implies a reallocation of wealth toward old-generation households, which under our specific lifecycle saving assumptions implies an initial fall in aggregate saving. This places a further initial burden on resource reallocation from the old to the new sector to fund the speculative expansion. However, it is important to keep in mind the simplifying assumption we made that old-sector capital is not subject to adjustment costs. In the presence of adjustment costs, the price of old-sector capital would fall initially and offset the redistribution of wealth toward dissavers. This would moderate the need to reallocate resources toward the new sector and the hike in interest rates. Over time, as the new sector generates saving, the price of old-sector capital recovers to its initial value.
Technology Bubbles
The U.S. speculative expansion of the 1990s was not only concentrated in the technology sector, it was also associated with an increase in productivity growth beyond what is attributable to pro-cyclical productivity (e.g., Baily and Lawrence (2001)). Table 1 presents average multifactor productivity growth for the U.S. economy in subsequent five-year intervals. It illustrates the acceleration of productivity growth in the second half of the 1990s. This type of evidence formed the basis for the case that the U.S. expansion was not due to market speculation, but to underlying fundamentals that pointed to a technolgical revolution (e.g., Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1999; Hobijn and Jovanovic, 2000) . To address this question, we endogenize growth in our two-sector model and show that the speculative growth equilibrium is associated with higher productivity growth. Moreover, we show that increased productivity growth provides increased future income that fuels the key feedback from growth to saving. Thus, increased productivity growth is not only a result of market speculation, but can also play a central role in the mechanisms that make a speculative equilibrium possible.
Thus, "fundamentals" versus "speculative bubble" might not constitute competing explanations for the U.S. experience. In our model, a technological revolution can be considered an integral part -both cause and consequence -of a speculative growth equilibrium.
Endogenizing growth. In order to endogenize growth in our two-sector model, we assume linear production functions in the two sectors and write aggregate output as
As before, the K-sector uses labor and the Z-second does not. We interpret K t in this model as "technology" capital, subject to standard external spillovers, and make the extreme assumption that K t enters as a pure externality in production, which is indicated by the superindex e on K e t . Because K t enters as a pure externality, its private fundamental value is q f ≡ 0. However, its price may be higher that q f and incorporate a bubble. As before, K t is accumulated according to (2), subject to adjustment costs; and Z t is subject to no adjustment costs.
Accumulation of K t is still determined by the q-theory relationship, x t = x(q t ).
In the absence of a private dividend, arbitrage equation (8) governing q t becomes
As long as Z t > 0, linear adjustment costs for Z t allow us to set the interest rate equal to the marginal product of Z t :
Finally, since the wage is AK e t , our assumption of undiscounted log-utility implies that the saving of the young is 
This equilibrium exhibits no productivity growth and no capital accumulation over time.
Under the high-valuation equilibrium, as long as Z * * t is positive, (20) and (22) imply that G K hx(q * * t )i ≡ r . The bubble is therefore equal to q * * given by
Thus, in the high-valuation equilibrium, productivity and output grow at endogenous rate γ * * .
Discussion. This model provides a stark example of speculative equilbrium that results in sustained endogenous growth. Even though neither the K-sector and nor the Z-sector are subject to social diminishing returns, only the former can be the engine of growth. The reason is that it is the only one that can generate the feedback from growth to saving necessary to fund investment along the balanced growth path. In the low-valuation trap, all saving is trapped in the Z-sector, which does not generate more saving as it grows. If the economy moves to the high-valuation equilibrium and incentivizes technology accumulation, saving shifts to the technology sector which will create more saving as it grows. This growth-saving feedback emerges through the technological spillover associated with technology investment, as productivity growth increases the income of savers. The feedback reduces the effective cost of capital, r − G K , and gives rise to a high-valuation equilibrium.
Two aspects of the high-valuation equilibrium are worth noting. First, unlike previous models, the fall in the effective cost of capital does not occur through a fall in the interest rate -which is equal to a constant, r. High valuations in the stock market will not be reflected by high valuations in the bond market. The reduction in the effective cost of capital takes the form of an increase in the flow-value, qG K , offered by capital in opening opportunities for profitable investment. This value increases together with the increase in the investment ratio, x. Put differently, the speculative increase in the valuation of technology is not associated with a fall in the interest rate, but with an increase in the value of future investment opportunities opened by technology. This increase in value is intimately associated with the high pace of investment in the high-valuation equilibrium.
Second, the effective cost of capital in the high-valuation equilibrium falls to an extreme level, r * * −G K = 0, consistent with the emergence of a technology bubble. In the presence of externalities, such a bubble -if sustainable -can enhance welfare.
Speculation of the type we anlayze can substitute for well-functioning markets and encourage investment and growth. Obviously, the risk is that the bubble may crash and trigger a crisis.
Public and Foreign Saving
Starting from the initial conditions of the bubbleless steady state in the models of sections 2 and 3, the bubbly equilibrium implies an investment boom. For this investment boom to materialize, it is important that it be supported by an increase in saving both in the short term and in the long term.
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Both models, whether we consider the short or the long run, rely on an increase in private domestic saving. Of course, this is only one of the possible saving channels that can fund investment. Figure 7 depicts the saving channels that funded the investment booms associated with the Nikkei and the Nasdaq bubbles. The investment boom in both episodes was actually accompanied by a decline in household savings that was only partly compensated by a mild increase in corporate savings. The main funding sources were government budget surpluses and the current account. This evidence relates to the funding of investment at the inception and "early" stages of the bubbles. Since the bubbles burst, we have no direct evidence on the long-term 21 Strictly, the model in section 3 does not need an increase in aggregate saving at impact since reallocation from old to new sector is possible.
Notes: Panel a: private domestic saving is "Gross Private Saving"; government saving is "Gross Government Saving" minus "Gross Government Investment"; foreign saving is minus "Net Foreign Investment". Panel b: for each domestic sector, gross saving is used which is defined as the sum of "Saving", "Consumption of fixed capital" and "Capital transfer etc. net"; foreign saving is minus "Net lending to the rest of the world". Guided by the short-run evidence and its relevance for the policy debate, this section focuses on two alternatives to domestic private savings in supporting speculative growth: government saving and the current account.
Fiscal Policy and Surplus Illusion
The fiscal surpluses generated during the Japanese and U.S. speculative growth experiences were the combined result of fiscal consolidation measures and the automatic effect of procylical tax revenues in a booming environment. The reduction in public debt had a moderating effect on interest rates in the short run and substituted for increased private savings to fund the investment boom. It is in this sense that a tight policy of paying down the national debt were supportive of the boom in the short term. Turning to the more novel issue of longer-term sustainability, and hence to a necessary condition for a rational expeculative growth episode, we argue that a continuing policy rule of generating fiscal surpluses provides critical support to the high valuation equilibrium.
To develop our argument we add a government to the model of section 3. We assume the government taxes wage income at a rate τ t and spends g t A t L on goods that do not enter agents' utility function. Thus the government's budget constraint is
Adding the public sector alters two equations in the model. The savings of the young, net of investment in z, are now a function of after-tax wages
while the capital-market equilibrium condition is now given by
The saving of the government and of the young must fund the purchase of the existing public debt and capital stock from the old as well as new investment. Combined, equations (24)-(25) define implicitly a new interest rate function r t = r(k t , q t , d t , τ t , g t ).
The economy's dynamics are described by system (9)-(10) with the new interest rate function together with the government budget constraint, (23), and a fiscal policy rule.
Let us consider a benchmark fixed-parameters policy rule, under which detrended government spending and the tax rate are fixed at g > 0 and τ > 0. To facilitate comparisons, we assume that this and other policy rules result in a balanced budget in the low-valuation steady state -which requires g = τ w * -and, therefore, result in the same low valuation steady state. The important point to notice is that this fixed-parameters policy creates primary surpluses during expansions beyond k * and primary deficits during contractions. To see this, note that this fiscal rule implies that the primary government surplus, (τ w t − g), increases with w t in an expansion.
Thus the response of the combined "gross" savings of government and the young to an increase in wages is given by
As long as the young's marginal propensity to save is less than one (s k w < 1), which we assumed, the fixed-parameter rule generates surpluses as the wage rises.
The increase in saving generated by the fixed-parameters rule not only facilitates the funding of investment in the short run but, more importantly, plays a central role in facilitating the emergence of a speculative growth scenario. This feasibility point is made most clearly by focusing on the high-valuation steady state rather than on the entire path. One can easily show that if rather than fixed, government spending is raised with the endogenous increase in the wage, aggregate savings fall and so does the high valuation steady-state capital stock, k * * . In fact this fiscal expansion experiment is similar to reducing ∆ s in section 2. For a high enough indexation of fiscal spending to wages, the high investment equilibrium is no longer feasible. In other words, fiscal surpluses are not only a symptom of the speculative growth episode, but can also be a central piece in the factors that support it.
The notion that the fiscal surpluses generated by the high-investment equilibrium can be partly spent or rebated to the tax payer may be an illusion. The surpluses could be a pillar of the high-investment equilibrium, and swiftly disappear if this equilibrium unravels -giving rise to what one might term as a surplus illusion.
The Current Account
The second major source of funding for the investment boom in Japan and the U.S.
was the current account. As a short-term funding mechanism, international capital flows can moderate the rise in interest rates needed to fund the investment boom.
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22 Ventura (2001) emphasizes an alternative portfolio channel connecting the current account and a domestic bubble. In his model, the main effect of the bubble is to raise domestic wealth. As domestic agents attempt to rebalance their portfolios by investing in non-bubbly domestic equity, external borrowing rises to finance the investment that is required to build domestic equity.
Over time, the whole world may be dragged into a speculative path, with the home economy becoming the chronic recipient of external resources.
A simple reinterpretation of the model in section 2 (or 3) helps isolate these short and long run aspects of capital inflows. For this purpose, let domestic residents now correspond to the old at time 0, and assume they owe foreigners 
Conclusion
This paper is an attempt to build a theoretical framework to think about episodes of speculative growth. We characterise this phenomenon as a high valuation equilibrium based on optimism about the future availability of funds for investment and, therefore, about a low effective cost of capital. Our framework highlights the key short-term and long-term funding mechanisms necessary to sustain a speculative growth equilibrium.
The emergence of a new sector, fiscal surpluses, or current account deficits are not only possible consequences of a high-investment equilibrium, but also central to generating the savings necessary to support it.
The principles we uncovered are more general than the models we discussed. To keep matters focused we highlighted purely neoclassical factors behind supply and demand for capital. It is not difficult to enrich the model and add financial frictions, which can substitute for some of our mechanisms. For example, in the model in section 3 we could eliminate the decreasing returns in the old sector and instead split the young into entrepreneurs and savers. The latter can invest in old-capital and lend to entrepreneurs. The multiplicity can be generated by the different values of entrepreneurs' internal funds and collateral along the different paths. A speculative path in this context is one that is driven by the endogenous relaxation of financial constraints.
Similarly, the role of fiscal rules in developing the conditions for a speculative growth episode can also be achieved by private sector practices. For example, stockoptions reallocate income flows toward managers and some key workers along a speculative growth path. If these are natural entrepreneurs or savers, stock-options will create a fertile ground for speculative growth episodes.
Finally, ours is not a framework of "irrational exhuberance," although it offers a natural interpretation to such episodes. These occur when the long run funding mechanism is not strong enough to eventually turn, without a crash, the explosive capital gains dynamics that are needed in the short run to reallocate resources toward the sectors that drive the boom. A prototypical example of such scenario is when a bubble attaches to the "wrong" sector. Importantly, whether such situation is present or not bears little relation to the price-earnings ratio and related statistics often discussed by analysts -these may be useful to assess relative valuations but miss the point when assessing the feasibility of an aggregate stock market boom. Of course, it is hard to verify in real time whether the future conditions are those that can support a rational speculative growth episode or not, but one could in principle check whether expectations of such mechanism are consistent with the path or not.
To this effect, we point out that the US episode of the 1990s come together with a significant decline in the slope of the yield curve, much of which was due to the fall in long rates. Exploring this lead seems worthwile.
A Parametric Example
This appendix provides the functional forms and parameter values underlying the simulations presented in figure 3 . The following functional forms were used:
g(x) = x − φx 2 , e s(w, r) = σ(r)w, Note that the function g satisfies g 0 (x) > 0 only for x < 1 2φ
, but as x(q) < 1 2φ
we have g 0 (x(q)) > 0 as well as g 00 (x(q)) < 0 for all q ∈ [q, ∞).
The functional form for g also yields
The saving functions is derived from a CES utility function with elasticity of substitution θ and discount factor β. Using equation (11) we obtain s(w, r) = ( σ(r)w, w < w(k o ); σ(r + ψ)w, w ≥ w(k o ).
Note that 0 < s w (w, r) < 1 holds whenever this partial derivative exists and that θ > 1 insures s r > 0. 
